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This paper investigates the relationship between the procurement methods used on building and 
construction projects, the opportunities for innovation and innovative solutions to client requirements, 
and the competitiveness of the Australian industry.  The economic theory of innovation suggests that 
returns to innovators from research and development (R&D) and positive externalities drive the 
process.  The argument is made that traditional tendering and procurement methods used by building 
industry clients works against these drivers of innovation in several important respects.  This paper 
reviews trends in R&D in the Australian building and construction industry, and assesses the 
importance of these trends for the international competitiveness of the industry in the context of 
alternative procurement methods and a changing regulatory environment. The analysis of the 
implications of these trends in deregulation and procurement for the international competitiveness of 
the Australian industry finds that they will determine the competitiveness of Australian building and 
construction.  The links between R&D and competitiveness is also discussed.  The paper concludes 
that the ability of the Australian industry to lift R&D investment will be an important determinant of 
competitiveness over the coming decade, which will see significant structural change in both the 








The purpose of this paper is to look at the links between competitiveness in the construction industry 
and the R&D intensity and level of innovation that characterizes the industry, and relate these to the 
procurement systems and market structure in the industry.  This discussion covers the relationship 
between R&D and procurement, R&D and deregulation under the Government Procurement 
Agreement, and the difficulty of achieving returns on R&D in an industry that is fragmented and 
highly dispersed.  The implications of these factors for the Australian industry are discussed. 
 
Innovation in the construction industry has been a focus of research for over a decade.  By the 
commonly accepted measures of innovation, such as patents, technological research papers, 
introduction of new products or process improvements (Freeman and Soete 1997: 7-8), the 
construction industry has a record of very low identifiable innovation.  This record is despite 
characteristics of the industry seen as favourable to innovation (Tatum 1986) and the importance of 
innovation for competitiveness in the industry (Flanagan 1999). 
 
Tatum (1986) identified seven features of the construction industry as advantages for innovation.  
Construction projects create teams presented with high levels of necessity and challenge, which 
promotes innovation by forcing examination of new technologies for each project.  Integration of 
engineering, design and construction can simplify the construction process and decrease cost.  The low 
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capital investment typical of construction firms allows high flexibility for the adoption of new 
technologies.  A pool of technologically experienced personnel provides depth of knowledge.  The 
strong emphasis on process limits barriers to imitation, because new processes can spread rapidly 
without patent restraints (but this may also discourage innovation).  Lastly, construction production 
processes do not create rigid restraints. 
 
Five characteristics of the construction industry were later identified by Tatum (1989) as being 
constraints to innovation.  The low capital intensity of the industry limits its interest in investment for 
automation.  If a firm has adequate market share and profitability then pressure to innovate is reduced.  
The institutional framework is not supportive of innovation (the number of firms, the legal incentives 
for technological inertia, regulatory influences, and craft organization of labour).  Building cycle 
volatility affects capital investment and economies of scale, and suppliers have not created 
technological improvements in the equipment and tools used by construction. 
 
Tatum's analysis is descriptive of the construction industry, but lacks a model of how innovation 
occurs in the industry.  Technological change and innovation have become central to the economic 
analysis of development of individual industries, and economic growth in general.  The state of any 
individual industry is seen as driven by and subject to the forces of competition, where competition is 
driven by changes in technological opportunities and appropriability of knowledge (Dumenil and Levi 
1995).  Firms typically are in a process of constant adjustment and selection, as industries adapt to 
entry and exit, and innovative projects or R&D are succeed or fail.  Nelson and Winter (1982) were 
the first to compare this to the biological concept of natural selection in evolution.  Verspagen (1998) 
suggests that economic systems adapt over time but do not necessarily produce optimal outcomes, as 
suggested by the work of Arthur (1988) or David (1985).  In the analysis of economic growth, this 
line of thinking led to the development of new growth theory, where investment in R&D leads to 
positive externalities and increasing returns to scale at the macro level (Romer 1990). 
 
Inter-firm differences in R&D and innovation accounts for differing rates of increase in productivity, 
improvements in the quality, and differentiation of products within industries.  The Canther and Pyka 
(1998) model sees firms engaging in R&D and what they describe as search and experimental 
activities, in pursuit of profits.  They also see technological development as cumulative, as industries 
develop along specific technological trajectories, with decreasing exploitable technological 
opportunities.  The benefits of new technology depends on how easy it is for new ideas and 
knowledge to be transferred to other firms in the same industry. 
 
So far there is no good explanation of the construction industry’s record of innovation, grounded in 
the broader theories of innovation available.  This paper develops a model of construction innovation 
in a revised framework, using procurement methods and market deregulation as potential drivers of 
innovation.  The argument is on two levels.  Firstly, at the level of industry structure, the relationship 
between innovation and concentration is discussed.  The issue here is whether the research intensity 
of construction is an outcome of industry competition rather than a requirement, as in high research 
intensity industries.  Secondly, the issues of appropriability of research and innovation revenues and 
treatment of knowledge externalities are considered in the context of procurement methods used. 
 
The discussion uses recent developments in two fields.  From the theory of industrial organization, 
Sutton’s (1991, 1999) theory of endogenous sunk costs and its application to fragmented, low 
research intensity industries is discussed.  Then, using the innovation paradigm from evolutionary 
economics, the effects on R&D from increased international competition are highlighted.  Finally, the 
paper includes the role of procurement methods used for building and construction projects as a 
determinant of the level of innovation in the industry. 
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AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY R&D 
 
It is rare for an Australian construction firm to have a R&D budget.  If R&D generates new ways of 
doing things, including improved construction methods and materials, then the industry's non-funding 
of R&D is a cause of the low productivity growth rate found in the Australian industry (for 
productivity estimates see Productivity Commission 1999).  Much of the R&D done by the 
construction industry is more in the nature of problem solving, and is specific to a particular project or 
a new technology imported from the materials or equipment manufacturers (Table 2 below shows the 
level of construction R&D expenditure by industry).  Because of the nature of this work it is not 
recognized as R&D, however in building and construction this may be the most important component 
of research and innovation.  Because it is difficult to collect data on this type of activity the real level 
of R&D in the construction industry is probably significantly understated. 
 
Research has shown that the level of R&D within building and construction in Australia is at the 
lower end of the scale when compared to other industry sectors.  A report by Building Research and 
Development Review Committee (BRDAC 1987) found R&D in relation to value added in 1986-87 
was 3.9% for agriculture, 3% for manufacturing, 1% for mining and 0.13% for construction.  A report 
from the Department of Industry, Science and Resources found little change a decade later, stating the 
industry "does not spend enough on R&D.  The nature of the industry also influences it to continue to 
use traditional methods of construction, rather than take the risk of innovating." (DISR 1999: 52). 
 
The BRDAC report described the construction industry as having a negative attitude towards R&D at 
an enterprise level.  The reasons for this were said to be the predominance of small businesses, low 
capitalisation, low operating surpluses and low productivity.  The industry's sensitivity to cyclic 
variations in the economy and the transient nature of various groups within the industry were also 
identified as factors contributing to the low level of R&D.  These factors still operate to create an 
environment which deters building and construction companies from investing in innovation without 
a clear short-term return.  In Australia, around 60% of construction R&D is funded by the public 
sector, shown in Table 1, and the business spend on construction R&D is concentrated in the 
manufacturing industries, as shown in Table 2.  Contractor spending in 1996-97 was 0.11% of 
income. 
 
Table 1.  R&D Expenditure on Construction, 1992-93 to 1996-97 (A$ million) 
Expenditure by: 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 Person years 1996-97 
Business 25.7 34.0 45.1 384 
Government (Commonwealth) 28.5 24.3 28.9 264 
Government (State) 10.2 6.8 7.0 50 
Higher education 38.5 27.7 32.3 648 
Private non-profit organisations 0.3 1.3 0.7 9 
Total 103.3 94.0 113.9 1,355 
Source: AEGIS, 1999: 153 
 
Table 2.  R&D Expenditures across Building and Construction Product System, 1996-97 (A$million) 
Industry Segment R&D expenditure 
($m) 
R&D expenditure as a 
% of income 
On-site Services (Trade Services) 0.65 0.003 
Client Services (Engineering, Technical, etc.) 2.91 0.034 
Building and Construction 3.80 0.011 
Materials and Products Supplies 31.87 0.077 
Machinery and Equipment Supplies 4.74 1.110 
Total 44.0 0.040 
Source: AEGIS, 1999:62. 
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RESEARCH INTENSITY  
 
There are major differences between industries in rates of both technological progress and 
productivity growth.  Efforts have been made to find both theoretical and empirical explanations of 
the factors that drive these differences, and the variables that can be applied to inter-industry 
differences in technology and productivity growth.  One explanation for differences among industries 
in technology and productivity growth is R&D intensity, or the degree of innovation that is found in 
the industry, and the differences between the R&D and innovative activity in one industry compared 
to another.  Research intensity is typically measured by R&D as a percentage of sales or income. 
 
R&D intensity in an industry is determined by two key variables.  One is "technological opportunity", 
which determines the productivity of R&D and the opportunities that are available for innovation.  
The other is the ability of innovating firms to "appropriate" a significant share of the economic value 
created by innovation, or to capture the externalities created through new knowledge.  However, 
although both these variables influence R&D intensity of firms in an industry, only technological 
opportunity will affect the rate of technological advance in an industry in the long-run, even if both 
opportunity and appropriability influence R&D intensity. 
  
“Differences across industries in their R&D intensities tend to be quite durable.  This suggests that, to 
the extent that these are the major determining variables, differences across industries and 
technological opportunities and inappropriability conditions tend to be persistent.”  (Nelson and 
Wolff 1997: 207). Nelson and Wolff propose cross industry differences in technological opportunities 
are due to R&D opportunities differing between industries.  In turn, differences between industries in 
technological progress will be driven by differences in R&D intensity, appropriability and opportunity 
that are available.  Their theory is that industries with high R&D intensity and technological 
opportunity must be receiving a high rate of flow of new technological opportunities to make up for 
those that are being exhausted.   
 
In the industrial organization or industry economics literature, industries are usually seen in terms of a 
number of firms which advance along a single technological trajectory, and these firms compete in 
enhancing the quality of their individual versions of the same basic product (homogeneity of product).  
In this case, firms make decisions on how much R&D to finance, and apply that R&D to product 
development.  This view fits some industries well, however many industries encompass several 
groups of products rather than a large number of versions of a single product.  The products may be 
close substitutes in consumption, but embody different technologies, so R&D projects that enhance 
products in one group may generate huge spillovers for products in other groups. 
 
Such complex overlapping patterns of substitutability have bedevilled industrial organization analysis 
for decades, since Chamberlin (1932) first developed the definition of an industry as limited by the 
chain of substitution, where industries were defined by their product.  If industries are broken into 
separate sub-industries in order to address this problem, the choice in R&D spending can be between 
any number of technologies for the development of different groups of products.  The products may 
be close or distant substitutes for products of firms on other technological trajectories.  Both of these 
linkages operate on the demand side.  When the linkages are strong they reflect the presence of scope 
economies in R&D; where the linkages are weak these scope economies will be absent and there will 
be a low degree of substitution across sub-markets. 
 
Applying this discussion of sub-markets to the building and construction industry raises a number of 
interesting issues.  The first is, of course, the general lack of specialisation of firms in the construction 
industry in terms of their product.  The answer to the question "What does the industry produce?" is 
varied; some believe that the industry provides services (management, coordination, finance), others 
believe the industry delivers products (buildings and structures).  The former group argues that the 
main task of the industry is one of coordinating site processes while the latter are more concerned 
with the building itself.  The building and construction industry is typically broken into the 
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engineering, non-residential, and residential building sectors, and there are some firms that cross all of 
these areas, however, typically firms work in either the residential or the non-residential sectors.  
Many of the larger firms cover both engineering and non-residential building in their activities.  
Within the non-residential building sector, there are ten or twelve different sub-markets, divided into 
offices, retail, factories, health, and so on.  Some firms specialize in building particular types of 
buildings, in Australia Grocon specialises in high-rise office buildings and Westfield specialises in 
shopping centres, however more commonly a building contractor will apply their management skills 
to a range of building types, and not limit themselves to specific sub-markets.  In this case, for the 
construction industry, sub-markets are difficult to identify because firms can be highly specialized in 
one area, or they can be highly generalized and put up a wide range of buildings and structures. 
 
R&D AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
The degree of monopoly power exercised by the largest firms in an industry is expressed in the 
concentration ratio, which is the degree to which an industry is dominated by the largest firms.  
Typically the concentration ratio uses the largest four firms in an industry, ranked by market share or 
sales as a percentage of total industry sales.  The definition of the concentration ratio is the percentage 
of industry total sales (other measures are capacity, output, employment or value added) accounted for 
by the largest firms.  The extent of control over prices is determined by the intensity of competition in 
a market, which is, in turn, determined by the number of firms and type of product. 
 
Sutton (1999) in his development of the theory of market structure and concentration, suggests the 
effect of R&D spending on the technological trajectory of industries is crucial.  Where the degree of 
substitutability across products associated with different R&D trajectories is high, concentration will 
necessarily be high, because if all firms have a low market share an increase in R&D spending will be 
profitable, and the high spending firm can capture sales from low spending rivals on its own trajectory 
and on others.  Sutton shows that under these circumstances, the number of trajectories along which 
firms will operate is small, since low spending firms are vulnerable to increases in R&D spending by 
rivals.  On the other hand, if the degree of substitution across products is low, then in spite of the 
effectiveness of R&D spending, concentration may be low.  "This can only happen if there are many 
product groups, associated with different independent R&D trajectories.....Here, escalation yields 
poor returns, since outspending rivals can lead only to the capture of sales from products in a single, 
small product group" (Sutton 1999: 13). 
 
In Sutton's analysis it turns out that industries or sub-industries with a low R&D to sales ratio, can 
have a low level of concentration, and this can continue indefinitely.  The industries where there are a 
large number of firms in an increasing market, characterized by buyers who place different relative 
weights on different aspects of technical performance (product attributes), and many alternative 
technologies are available for those products, leads to a market where there is an indefinite number of 
firms, each with a small market share.  For this type of industry with low R&D spending, Sutton's 
theory predicts that the concentration ratio will be low and that the level of concentration will 
decrease as the size of the market increases.  The characteristics of such industry are compared to 
industries where the R&D to sales ratio exceeds a high threshold value, and Sutton's theory predicts 
that concentration will increase as the spending on R&D increases.  In a low R&D intensity industry, 
the market share of the largest firm will be relatively small, in a high R&D intensity industry the 
market share of the largest firm can be very high (Sutton 1999: 14-16). 
 
The importance of industry structure lies in the way that structure is the most important determinant 
of competition, and the form that competition takes, in an industry.  Related issues are the way the 
process of competition affects prices and profits, the ease of entry of new firms into or frequency of 
exit from an industry, the impact of demand shocks (i.e. the business cycle) and the effects of new 
technologies, such as e-business and e-commerce.  However, for the building and construction 
industry the methods used for tendering and procurement of projects are important determinants of the 
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level and form of competition in the industry, and distinguish the industry from many others where 
competition is through marketing campaigns, new products and so on. 
 
PROCUREMENT AND INNOVATION 
 
Owners and clients are increasingly using a variety of alternative procurement methods aimed at 
reducing cost, achieving time schedules and milestones, shortening duration, reducing claims, and 
improving constructability and innovation.  The overall trend is toward versions of design and build 
and turnkey construction because of the advantages of a project delivery system that combines 
designers, builders, and sometimes suppliers into a single entity (de Valence and Huon 1999).  Many 
surveys have established that clients perceive the design and build (D&B) approach as providing 
better value for money, and giving rise to less disputes than other procurement methods, also that an 
experienced client with a clear brief can use it satisfactorily with most project sizes (Songer and 
Molenaar 1996, Ndekugri and Turner 1994, Akintoye 1994).   
 
The move away from traditional procurement systems will have significant effects on innovation.  
Because the traditional design-bid-build method does not allow for capture of intellectual property 
and knowledge externalities by contractors in their tenders, there was a perverse disincentive to 
innovate.  With the increased use of non-traditional procurement methods such as design and 
construct (D&C), D&B, build, own, operate (BOO), and build and maintain (B&M), this disincentive 
is removed and firms can appropriate the benefits of innovation and R&D 
 
Craig (1997a) discusses innovation in D&C procurement systems, where the contractor bears single 
point responsibility for the complete product, like any other manufacturer.  However, unlike deciding 
which car to buy a building is purchased through the tender process, which must not only evaluate 
design, but also production capability, time and price, and on a competitive basis.  Procurement of 
projects through the tendering process appears to limit the successful tenderer's scope to be 
innovative.  This paper concludes tendering rules or codes have been developed to maintain the 
integrity of the bidding process, not to encourage innovation.  Craig (1997b) argues that ‘alternative 
tenders’ are potentially valuable to both clients and contractors, and to society at large.  Contractors 
can make novel proposals to owners., and society benefits from such innovation.  Tenderers can put 
forward more efficient and cost effective methods of construction, however there is not yet sufficient 
established custom and practice for modification of the existing ‘tendering contract’. 
 
Craig (2000) develops these issues and asks three questions on procurement and innovation. The first 
is: do tendering processes encourage innovation?  The essential basis of the tendering code is that all 
tenderers are to be treated equally and fairly, that contract award criteria are established in advance 
and known by all parties, thus creating a transparent award process.  Tendering rules produce direct 
price competition for a specified product.  The question then becomes: can traditional tendering 
processes permit innovation?  The answer is that a successful tenderer's scope to be innovative is very 
limited.  There is opportunity to find novel ways of organising work to achieve maximum profits 
within the tender price.  Opportunity exists for 'bid shopping' to drive down subcontract prices.  One 
tender might seek competitive advantage by offering to the owner a contract term more favourable 
than any from a competitor.  Craig asks: what scope is there, at tender stage, to offer the client novel 
design (which is the bidder's intellectual property) at a saving on the original design?  Bidders are not 
asked to put forward design suggestions, there are no criteria for evaluation of novel proposals, 
tenderers cannot be treated equally and fairly if one is preferred on an 'alternative' tender, which is a 
non-conforming tender in terms of the original invitation. 
 
Finally, Craig (2000) asks: does D&B or D&C as a procurement system more easily permit 
innovation?  The point is made above that using the tender process to competitively evaluate design, 
capability, time and cost is not easy.  “Competitive design is not easy to evaluate in the context of 
tendering.  Traditionally it has been done by a two-stage process …a design competition … and 
production competition.  Wrap this up in a single stage process and the objectivity appears to be 
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replaced by subjectivity in picking the winner, and the apparent integrity of the bidding process is 
lost, unless very clear integrity criteria are established at the outset for evaluation of competing 
designs.” (Craig 2000:33).  Craig concludes that the traditional tendering process for building works 
does not encourage design innovation by tenderers, but it has always been possible for tenderers to 




The construction industry fits into the category of a fragmented, low research intensity industry.  As 
such it is responsible for few new products and much process innovation is in response to 
developments in other industries, particularly materials manufacturers and the information technology 
and communications (ICT) industries. Sutton’s theory predicts that this type of industry typically 
undergoes a significant increase in concentration as national markets are deregulated and opened up.  
This is what the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) reached through the World Trade 
Organization is doing, by opening member countries public sector construction projects to 
international competition.  Therefore the GPA might lead to a few large contractors dominating each 
national market, probably with a different mix of national and international firms in each market.  The 
rise of these large firms might then be an important element in increasing R&D and innovation in the 
industry. 
 
Governments in many countries have made changes in their policies and regulations on procurement 
under the regulations formulated by the World Trade Organisation (Korman 1997, Ashenfelter et al. 
1997, Mattoo 1996, Ichniowski 1995).  Reforms are underway in the bidding and contractual systems 
used for public projects in Australia, Japan, South Korea, Europe and the US.  These countries are 
opening their construction markets to contractors from foreign countries, often with less 
discriminatory and more competitive forms of tendering (Gransberg and Ellicott 1996, Spacek 1996, 
Reich 1997).  Reform of the bidding and contractual system used for public projects in Japan, and 
government policies on further opening of the construction market to foreign countries, is discussed 
by Kunishima et al. (1995).  Japan's 1995 ‘Action Plan’ provided for open and competitive bidding 
procedures to be used by public agencies, for procurement of construction, design, and consulting 
work that are valued at or above the WTO government procurement thresholds (Dunn 1995). 
 
Legislative changes in the US are allowing public owners the opportunity to use design-build as a 
project delivery option (Krizan 1996, Loulakis and Cregger 1996).  Changes in the US federal 
government's procurement system to allow federal agencies to use a limited form of design-build 
construction contracts has led to the establishment of procedures for agencies to follow when they 
enter into a design-build project.  To combat the problems inherent with traditional low-bid 
procurement, many states are following the example of the federal government by enacting 
procurement options to allow and encourage alternative methods (Charles 1996). 
 
The experience of other industries after deregulation has been a significant increase in competition for 
domestic companies as new entrants, often large established international firms, come into their home 
markets.  The larger the firm, the more likely it is to engage in R&D and innovation.  Therefore, the 
expansion of international contractors into new markets could lead to an increase in both the size of 




Competitiveness drives the economic performance of countries and industries exposed to international 
competition.  The competitiveness of nations in the global economy lies in the four broad attributes of 
a nation described by Porter (1990), attributes that individually and as a system constitute Porter's 
'diamond of national advantage'.  This is the playing field that each nation establishes and operates for 
its industries.  These attributes are: 
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1. Factor conditions - the nation's position in factors of production, such as skilled labour or 
infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry. 
2. Demand conditions - the nature of home-market demand for the industry's product or service. 
3. Related and supporting industries - the presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries 
and other related industries that are internationally competitive. 
4. Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry - the conditions in the nation governing how companies are 
create, organized, and managed, as well as the nature of domestic rivalry. (Porter 1990: 139) 
 
The Porter diamond identifies the determinants of industry competitiveness: 
 
These determinants create the national environment in which companies are born and learn how 
to compete.  Each point on the diamond - and the diamond as a system - affects essential 
ingredients for achieving international competitive success: the availability of resources and 
skills necessary for competitive advantage in an industry; the information that shapes the 
opportunities that companies perceive and the directions in which they deploy their resources 
and skills; the goals of the owners, managers, and individuals in companies; and most 
important, the pressures on companies to invest and innovate. 
 
When a national environment permits and supports the most rapid accumulation of specialized 
assets and skills - sometimes simply because of greater effort and commitment - companies gain 
a competitive advantage.  When a national environment affords better ongoing information and 
insight into product and process needs, companies gain a competitive advantage.  Finally, when 
the national environment pressures companies to innovate and invest, companies both gain a 
competitive advantage and upgrade those advantages over time. (Porter 1990: 140) 
 
With deregulation and the opening of national markets for public sector projects, as in Australia, 
contractors will be subject to increasing competition.  This will make the ability to enhance 




The importance of competitiveness is increasing as the global economy develops as both a market for 
Australian firms and as a source of new competitors.  The ‘diamond’ of factors that determine an 
industry’s competitiveness are affected by government policies and attitudes.  The GPA will increase 
openness to trade, capital and technology movements in building and construction, and this openness 
increases opportunities for greater economies of scale and scope and specialisation of firms, two 
important sources of competitiveness. 
 
The alternative methods and systems of procurement and delivery being increasingly used by clients 
will emphasise innovative design solutions in order to lower ownership or occupancy costs.  As major 
projects become part of an international, globalised market with deregulation of public sector 
procurement.  Australian contractors will be competing against aggressive new entrants from other 
countries into their market, who will use the increasing diversity and complexity of procurement 
methods to win a share of the market.  Also, the clients who have major projects are typically 
experienced, long-term investors with considerable expertise in alternative procurement methods.  
The traditional tendering and procurement process for building works is not amenable to innovation 
by tenderers.  Craig (2000) suggests there are processes available for procurement of design services 
which allow competition on innovative design, in which design/ technical matters of the tenders are 
evaluated separately from price and could be used for D&C procurement. 
 
The influence of procurement methods has been a determining factor in the level of innovation in the 
industry, and the significance of increased use of alternative forms of procurement is their providing 
incentives for increased R&D and innovation.  When combined with deregulation the effect will be to 
move the industry toward more R&D.  In the past, the level of innovation may have been an outcome 
CIB World Building Congress, April 2001, Wellington, New Zealand Page 9 of 11 
Paper: NOV 15 
 
of industry structure, not a determinant, however a more R&D intensive industry would tend toward 
having structure determined by research intensity.  As R&D expenditure increases the potential level 
of concentration in the industry also rises, and the interplay between these factors will determine the 
eventual number of large firms in the industry. 
 
Finally, the pace of development in technologies related to building and construction (particularly in 
automation, software integration and general ICT) makes it possible that traditional methods and 
processes could be swept away in a technological revolution that rapidly makes many of the craft-
based traditions in the industry obsolete.  This has happened in many other industries, such as 
automobiles in the early 1900s and steel making at the end of the century. 
 
Technological change is significantly changing the competitive environment in the building and 
construction industry.  Therefore, the level of technology used by the construction industry in 
Australia is important.  The building technologies and methods used by the industry do not appear to 
significantly lag those in similar countries.  In the design work that utilises new materials and 
principles Australia is clearly competitive.  By any reasonable list of technology indicators that 
includes the major developments of the past two decades, the Australian industry cannot be seen to 
have been slow at adopting and adapting overseas developments.  However, the level of investment in 
R&D and innovation by the Australian industry is low, and this threatens the future competitiveness 
of the industry with the increasing international competitive challenge to Australian contractors.  With 
global economic competition the importance of creating a high value adding, high productivity growth 
industry increases. 
 
The necessary conditions for competitiveness include strong and sustained levels of productivity 
growth, an openness to innovation and new technology, and a commitment to delivering value for 
clients' money.  In the light of these conditions the Australian construction industry undoubtedly has 
the potential to achieve international standards of on time, on cost high quality projects.  On their own 
these conditions are not sufficient however, other factors that relate to the attitudes of industry 
participants to R&D and innovation and the level of investment in R&D by the industry.  These will 
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